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Several interesting propositions were announced in the decision.
First, damages were allowed for depreciation in the value of
the car during the interval between its seizure and its return
to plaintiff plus one thousand dollars for "humiliation, mortifi-
cation and mental anxiety, and for physical discomfort and in-
convenience as a result of the deprivation of use and enjoyment
of his car during the period of its seizure and detention."9 With
respect to these latter items the approach of the Louisiana court
differs from the usual common law position under which the
plaintiff would be entitled to indemnity for the deprivation of
use and enjoyment of the car, which would usually amount to
the rental value of the vehicle during the period affected. Emo-
tional and non-pecuniary losses are usually denied in such cases,
although if the conduct of defendant were oppressive, an award
of punitive damages would be permitted at common law. In the
Hernandez case it was conceded that the defendant did not act
arbitrarily, oppressively, or in bad faith. In fact, the right to
possession of the car was in good faith dispute during the entire
period of its detention. The second point involved in the Her-
nandez case related to the defendant's plea of prescription. Nor-
mally the prescriptive period of one year runs from the. time
of wrongful seizure. Here, however, where the title to the prop-
erty was in litigation in a separate dispute, the court properly
announced that the present claim could not have been effectively
prosecuted until title had been determined. Hence the running




Work Which Is Not Part of Employer's
Trade, Business, or Occupation
Two years ago the Supreme Court decided the case, Meyers
v. Southwest Region Conference Association of Seventh Day Ad-
ventists,1 in which it concluded that a church organization is. a
business, trade, or occupation within the meaning of the Work-
men's Compensation Statute. As this writer pointed out in a pre-
9. Id. at 401, 111 So.2d at 324.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 230 La. 310, 88 So.2d 381 (1956).
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vious issue of this symposium, 2 this decision is sound in regard-
ing an organization supported by a substantial group as being
appropriately included within the compensation principle. How-
ever, in the Meyers case the Supreme Court fortified its opiniQn
by the following observation as to the nature of a business:, A
business, said the court, "is that which busies or engages time,
attention, or labor as a principal serious concern or interest.
3
Under this broad definition (which was not necessary to justify
the conclusion that a church is a business within the meaning
of the statute) many sustained activities of a purely private., or
domestic character would be included.
Last year this definition was put to test in McMorris v. Home
Indemnity Insurance Company.4 An employee of a federal agen-
cy devoted nine weeks of accumulated vacation leave to the con-
struction of a home for his own use. He hired claimant and
seven other workers to assist in this project. Claimant sustained
an injury and instituted suit for compensation. Recovery was
allowed by the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit, which em:
phasized the above definition of a business from the Meyers
case.5 The opinion of the court of appeal also stressed the fact
that the work being done by claimant was of a type customarily
performed by professional contractors for profit. However, this
judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court and McMorris'
claim was dismissed. The Supreme Court reverted to its 6arlier
position in the familiar decision, Shipp v. Bordelon, wherein it
had observed:
"It is not enough that the employee shall be performiig
work of the character falling within the designated trades,
businesses, or occupations, but it must be done 'in the course
of the employer's trade,' etc., in certain trades, businesses,
etc. In other words, the work must be of that character,
and the employer must be engaged in that line of work as a
trade, business, or occupation, in order that the Act may
apply . "6
Causal Relation Between Strain and Stomach Ulcer
Cutnov,. Neeb Kearney and Company7 is a decision worthy of
note even though the principal issue was one of fact. Cutno, Who
.4. 17 :LOU SIANA LAW REviEw 350 (1957).
3. 230 La. 310, 319, 88 So.2d 381, 384, (1956)..
4. 236' 1.292, 107 So.2d 645 (1959).
5. 94 So.2d 471 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
6. 152 La. 795, 797, 94 So. 399, 400 (1922).
7. 237 La. 828, 112 So.2d 620 (1959).
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Was a victim of duodenal ulcers, suffered a perforation and
hemorrhage on the job while engaged in lifting hundred pound
Sacks. The trial court's judgment dismissing his compensation
claim for failure to show a causal connection was reversed by the
Supreme Court. Previous decisions of the courts of appeal had
refused to recognize that strain and stress can aggravate an
ulcer condition.8 Also noteworthy in the Cutno case is the court's
reaffirmation of the proposition that no unusual exertion' is
necessary in order 'to qualify a strain as an "accident" within
the meaning of the Compensation Statute ;9 nor is the claim for
compensation weakened by the fact that the pre-existing ulcer-
ated condition of the stomach would have eventually ended in
hemorrhage and perforation even though the exertion in ques-
tion had not taken place. 10 Moreover, the adverse effect of the
stress and strain need not manifest itself at once, so long as a
causal relationship between the two is established to the satisfac-
tion of the trier.
Total Disability - Successive Injuries Under
Separate Employers
A worker receives a back injury while working for defend-
ant. i A few months later he apparently recovers and accepts em-
ployment with a new employer. Thereafter he experiences. a
"catch" in his back while discharging his duties and he is con-
cededly permanently and totally disabled. If the medical testi-
mony establishes satisfactorily that the initial accident was
causally connected with the ultimate disability (and suit is insti-
tuted within the two-year limitation established by the statute),
c6.the first employer, defendant, be subjected to compensation
liability? The Supreme Court gave an affirmative answer in the
recent decision, Finley v. Hardware Mutual Insurance Com-
pany,", decided last term. It is to be noted that a situation of
this type involves two separate inquiries. The first is purely one
Of fact: Did the first accident play a causal part in bringing
about the eventual disability? The answer here is to be afforded
8. Burks v. Central Surety & Ins. Co., 6 So.2d 45 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942);
Mitchell v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 5 So.2d 152 (La. App. 2d Cir., 1941)
Laqdry. v. Phoenix Utility Co., 124, So. 623 (La. App. Orl. 1929).
9. For discussion, see MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
AND VIUACTICE §214 (1951). !.
l. Excellent discussion of this point will be found in Custer v, Higgins In-
dstries, 24 So.2d 511. (La. App. Orl. 1946).,.... ...
11. 237 La, 214, 110 So.2d 583 (1959).
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solely by the medical testimony. The first event that occurred
during the employment under the defendant is a cause if the
ultimate result - disability following the later strain - would
not have occurred without the first accident. It is at this point
that the court of appeal had ruled against the claimant and was
reversed by the Supreme Court. The second inquiry is purely
one of law, or compensation policy - Does the compensation
statute protect the worker against the risk of a later accidental
aggravation of the result of an earlier accident so as to charge
the first employer therefor? The Supreme Court made abun-
dantly clear in Finley's case that such protection is afforded by
the statute. The same position had been announced several times
before by the courts of appeal of this state. Two of these de-
cisions, White v. Taylor and Brock v. Jones Laughlin Supply
Company, 8 were cited with approval by the Supreme Court in
the Finley case. Another court of appeal decision reaching the
same conclusion and which may be of interest to the reader is
Estilette v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company.1 4 It is
also noteworthy that where the second, and aggravating, acci-
dent occurs during the course of employment under a new em-
ployer the latter may also be chargeable with compensation. He
cannot escape his compensation responsibility by pointing to the
peculiar susceptibility of the worker to injury by reason of the
earlier accident, for the second employer takes the employee as
he finds him.' Solidary liability is proper in such situations.
Posthumous Illegitimate Child not Dependent
Member of Family
During the last term the Supreme Court reversed the Court
of Appeal for the Second Circuit' 6 and concluded that a post-
humous illegitimate child born of an illicit union between the de-
ceased and his concubine who was residing with and dependent
on deceased was not a dependent member of the family and hence
was not entitled to compensation.' 7 The opinion contains the
surprising observation that at the time of the worker's death the
12. 5 So.2d 337 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941).
13. 39 So.2d 904 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949).
14. 64 So.2d 878 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
15. See MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PEACTICX
§ 272 (Supp. 1959).
16. Williams v. American Employers Ins. Co., 103 So.2d 568 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1958).
17. Williams v. American Employers Ins. Co., 237 La. 101, 110 So.2d 541
(1959).
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unborn child was not actually, but only constructively, depend-
ent upon deceased. The decision is difficult to appreciate from
the standpoint either of logic or of policy. First, it is difficult
to understand in what respect such a child is not actually de-
pendent upon the father who was providing food and support
for the mother at the time of death. Certainly the fact that sus-
tenance provided by the father reaches the child through the
body of the mother should not affect the child's dependency on
the father. If so, the courts would be obliged to deny compensa-
tion to all illegitimates who were breast fed at the time of the
father's death. From the standpoint of compensation policy the
decision is even more difficult to appreciate. The statute ex-
pressly protects the posthumous legitimate child, 8 thereby recog-
nizing the social need for the protection of children born after
the father's death. This need is equally great where the child is
illegitimate. This is demonstrated conclusively by the fact that
our courts have consistently protected illegitimates as "other de-
pendents." 19 There were two well-reasoned dissenting opinions.
Award of Attorneys' Fees Under Penalty Provision
The provision for fees as penalties under the Insurance Code
is limited only by the requirement that the fee must be reason-
able. On the other hand, the provision for the fixing of fees
under the Compensation Statute limits the fee arbitrarily to
twenty percent of the first five thousand dollars of the award
and ten percent of any recovery in excess of that amount. These
latter limitations in the statute itself are intended as a protec-
tion to the employee, for generally the attorneys' fees must be
paid out of such award. Where, however, the fee is assessed as a
penalty payable by the employer, the purpose of the limitation
disappears and it should be ignored, and the fee can be fixed by
the court according to the provisions of the Insurance Code.
This conclusion was reached recently by the Supreme Court in
Cain v. Employers Casualty Company,20 where the fee was asses-
sable against the insurer under the Insurance Code. Where the
fee is assessed against the employer himself under R.S. 23:
1201.2, the statute itself specifically excludes the limitation gen-
erally applicable to attorneys' fees in compensation litigation.
18. LA. R.S. 23:1021(3) (1950); Eason v. Alexander Shipyards, 47 So.2d
114 (La. App. Orl. 1950).
19. Caddo Contracting Co. v. Johnson, 222 La. 796, 64 So.2d 177 (1953)
Thompson v. Vestal Lbr. & Mfg. Co., 208 La. 83, 22 So.2d 842 (1945).
20. 236 La. 1085, 110 So.2d 108 (1959).
